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Abstract
We develop a real-time anomaly detection algorithm for directed activity on large,
sparse networks. We model the propensity for future activity using a dynamic logistic
model with interaction terms for sender- and receiver-specific latent factors in addition
to sender- and receiver-specific popularity scores; deviations from this underlying model
constitute potential anomalies. Latent nodal attributes are estimated via a variational
Bayesian approach and may change over time, representing natural shifts in network
activity. Estimation is augmented with a case-control approximation to take advantage
of the sparsity of the network and reduces computational complexity from O(N2) to
O(E), where N is the number of nodes and E is the number of observed edges. We run
our algorithm on network event records collected from an enterprise network of over
25,000 computers and are able to identify a red team attack with half the detection
rate required of the model without latent interaction terms.
1 Introduction
The near ubiquity of reliable and cost-effective telecommunications technology means that
even small or medium size organizations maintain enterprise networks with thousands of
interconnected devices. The “Internet of Things (IoT),” bringing with it smart homes,
streets, cars, and offices, has further increased the number and type of networked devices.
Modern networks now consist of a mix between devices where electronic communication is a
primary function (e.g. computers, servers, or smart speakers) and devices that are intended
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for another purpose but maintain network connectivity for convenience or remote access (e.g.
home appliances or cars).
These expanding enterprise networks provide unparalleled access and convenience for de-
vice users, but also increase potential points of vulnerability for cyberattacks. In this paper,
we present a scaleable statistical approach for identifying anomalous behavior in enterprise
networks. We use latent space models (Hoff et al., 2002) to parsimoniously represent the,
likely complex, structure of the connectivity graph and represent higher order dependence
between devices. This approach provides a richer baseline description of network behav-
ior than current approaches that, for computational reasons, focus on either single device
behavior or clusters of devices. We use a combination of variational and case-control ap-
proximations to ensure that our approach can both represent rich network structure and be
implemented on the large-scale networks.
Our approach simultaneously addresses three key challenges which are critical for anomaly
detection in cybersecurity settings. Our approach (i) uses a baseline model for behavior on
the network that incorporates higher order dependence between networked devices, (ii) in-
cludes a scaleable computational algorithm that leverages the sparsity in enterprise networks
and (iii) captures dynamics through an efficient online updating scheme.
First, a common approach for anomaly detection in this setting is to build a model that
represents normal behavior and use deviations from this model to flag potential anomalies
(Neil et al., 2013a). Ahmed et al. (2016) provides a survey of alternate anomaly detection
techniques in network settings. When using a probabilistic baseline model, each pair of
devices, or dyad, has a propensity to interact in a given time period. If observed device
interactions are very unlikely under the baseline model, then an anomaly is registered for
further investigation.
We propose a baseline that incorporates higher order network properties using a latent
position model (Hoff et al., 2002). These models represent the likelihood of two devices
interacting based on distance in an unobserved geometric space. The closer the estimated
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positions of the two devices, the more likely they are to interact. The latent distance model
captures higher order features of the graph, such as the propensity to form triangles, through
the geometry of the latent space. Our approach is in contrast to existing baseline models
which, for computational reasons, avoid complex interaction terms, opting for simple sender-
and receiver-specific popularity terms (Neil et al., 2013b) or clustering nodes and modeling
interactions at a cluster level (Metelli and Heard, 2016). While an approach that relies on
individual device effects will be effective for capturing some types of attacks (e.g. if an
attacker uses an infected device in a way that dramatically increases the activity of that
device), it will fail to detect more sophisticated attacks that change the pattern of device
behavior rather than simply the volume.
Second, we develop a strategy for online computation that leverages the sparsity in
enterprise networks. As alluded to above, computation in network models depends not on
the scale of devices, but on the scale of device pairs, or dyads. If N is the number of
devices, then there are approxameltely N2 possible dyads. A system with 25,000 devices, for
example, will have over 600 million dyads, making any algorithm that requires evaluating
the full likelihood via summation of over device pairs completely infeasible. This scale also
precludes Bayesian computation using Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC), as is typically
done for network models. We leverage the variational message passing algorithm described
in Minka (2005) with a case control approximation inspired by Raftery et al. (2012) in order
to reduce the computation cost from O(N2) to O(E), where E  N2 is the number of
observed edges in the network. Since the computational complexity scales with the number
of realized connections, rather than the number of possible ones, the algorithm will be
particularly efficient for sparse graphs. Sparsity is a common feature in enterprise networks.
For example, most end-user machines do not talk to each other, rather they communicate
with servers, vastly reducing the number of dyads. In the data we use in our empirical
evaluation, for example, an average of 0.02% possible dyads communicate in any four hour
period.
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Our method has similarities to existing dynamic network models using latent projections
and to previous work on variational inference for network models. Sewell and Chen (2015)
and Durante and Dunson (2016) both propose models with temporal dynamics, but are diffi-
cult to scale to graphs of the size we encounter in enterprise networks. Salter-Townshend and
Murphy (2013) also propose a variational algorithm in the static latent position model (Hoff
et al., 2002). Their approach is based on minimizing KL divergence, finding substantial com-
putational gains over a comparable MCMC even before using the case-control approximation
from Raftery et al. (2012). The primary expectation required in the algorithm is inherently
intractable, and they proceed via a series of Taylor series expansions in order to reach an
tractable expression. In contrast, we choose to adopt a variational approach minimizing a
different divergence metric but resulting in a tractable, analytic set of updating equations.
Sewell et al. (2017) also propose a scaleable computational algorithm for dynamic networks,
but focus on detecting community structure rather than identifying anomalous behavior.
Third, we propose an efficient dynamic updating procedure to capture variations in be-
havior over time. Taking advantage of the parametric form of the variational approximation
to the posterior, we allow our parameters to update with discrete time dynamics via Gaussian
random walks, adopting the autotuning procedure from McCormick et al. (2012) in order to
flexibly adjust the amount of additional variation introduced at each time step. In addition
to their autotuning procedure, McCormick et al. (2012) propose a general purpose algorithm
for estimating dynamic logistic regression models. However, their approach jointly updates
the logistic parameters via Newton’s method and requires inversion of the corresponding
Hessian. When the number of parameters in the model is large, such as when each node has
a specific popularity term, this process becomes infeasible.
We evaluate our method using the Netflow activity data collected by the Los Alamos
National Laboratory (LANL) on their enterprise network for a period of 89 days (Turcotte
et al., 2018). Each record consists of directed communication between network devices, and
network activity is logged between over 25,000 devices over these 89 days. In cybersecurity, a
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major objective is to flag potential intrusions on the network. The detection of these invaders
is time sensitive, reflecting a desire to prevent further intrusion when possible. The LANL
data also contain a so-called “red team” attack, which is a simulated cyberattack that mimics
tactics used by actual attackers. The “red team” attack provides a ground truth event to
use for benchmarking discovery. The data are available at https://csr.lanl.gov/data/
2017.html.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.1 we describe the static
bilinear effects model. In Section 2.2 we present the variational message passing algorithm for
the static model as well as the case-control modification. Section 2.4 adapts the model and
algorithm to a dynamic setting, and Section 2.5 describes anomaly detection after estimation
is complete. In Section 3 we demonstrate the performance of our algorithm in a simulation
study, in Section 4 we apply our algorithm to the LANL computer network data, and in
Section 5 we conclude.
2 Dynamic Latent Space Models
In this section we present our model and computation strategy. We first present a network
model and computational approach for static graphs and then describe how we incorporate
temporal dynamics.
2.1 Bilinear Mixed-Effects Model
To model baseline behavior at a given time point we use the logistic specification of the
bilinear mixed-effects model (Hoff, 2005). Letting yi,j indicate the presence of directed
activity from sender i to receiver j (e.g. a message passed from a computer to a networked
printer), under this model
yi,j = Bernoulli(pi,j), (1)
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where
logit(pi,j) = µ+ αi + βj + u
T
i vj. (2)
µ controls the overall sparsity of the network, while αi and βj represent sender- and receiver-
specific popularity terms and ui and vj are d-dimensional sender and receiver-specific latent
factors. The interaction term uTi vj captures the affinity between i and j, and can be inter-
preted as the additional propensity for senders with certain latent characteristics to interact
with receivers with other certain latent characteristics over the baseline propensity implied
by their respective popularities.
We complete our Bayesian model by introducing independent Gaussian priors for each
of the parameters:
αi ∼ N(0, σα) βj ∼ N(0, σβ)
ui ∼ N(0,Σu) vj ∼ N(0,Σv)
µ ∼ N(0, σµ).
Lastly, we use N to denote the number of nodes in the network and the N × N matrix Y
to denote all directed activity in the network. Without loss of generality, we assume the
number of senders and the number of receivers in the network are equal.
2.2 Variational Inference
Let θ ≡ {µ, αi, ...βj, ...ui, ...vj...} denote the set of latent variables in the bilinear mixed-
effects model. Given the large number of parameters, we wish to construct a parsimonious
representation of the posterior p(θ|Y). For example, the posterior covariance between the
sender- and receiver-specific popularity terms would require the storage of a N ×N matrix.
To this end, we focus on learning a fully-factorized approximation q(θ) to the posterior, with
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independent terms for each latent variable. Specifically,
q(θ) = q(µ)
∏
i
q(αi)q(ui)
∏
j
q(βj)q(vj), (3)
where each marginal term is modeled with a Gaussian (with d × d covariance matrices for
each of the latent factor terms). Representing the posterior of each latent variable with an
independent Gaussian leads to a storage complexity of O(N) and will also help facilitate the
introduction of temporal dynamics in the following section.
Inference proceeds as a direct application of power expectation propagation (Power EP)
(Minka, 2005) and takes the form of a message passing algorithm. We describe the algorithm
in detail below but omit some of the theoretical basis provided in (Minka, 2005).
First, we can recast the posterior as a product of factors, where each factor is either an
dyadic observation or a prior over a latent variable.
p (θ|Y) ∝ p (Y|θ) p (θ) (4)
∝
∏
(i,j)
f(i,j) (θ) (5)
We use (i, j) to index the factor denoting the directed dyad i→j, with (0, k) for the factor
denoting the prior over the kth latent variable θk. We arbitrarily index the set of latent
variables in our model with k for notational simplicity for contexts in which the differences
between the various latent variables are unimportant. We cast our fully-factorized approxi-
mation q (see equation (3)) in light of the same factors such that the approximation to the
posterior for θk is the product of messages from each of the factors (i, j) to θk:
q (θk) =
∏
(i,j)
m(i,j)→θk (θk) . (6)
Rearranging terms, we can also view the product of messages from a factor (i, j) as an
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approximation f˜i,j to that factor:
f(i,j) (θ) ≈ f˜(i,j) (θ) ≡
∏
k
m(i,j)→θk (θk) . (7)
Each message can be conceptualized as the contribution of a single factor to the posterior
of a single variable. If a variable is not involved with a given factor (e.g. the sender popularity
αj when considering the factor i→j with sender i and receiver j), the message is uniform and
provides no contribution to the posterior. Under power expectation propagation, inference
proceeds by iteratively selecting a single factor (i, j) and updating the messages from (i, j)
to the relevant variables (µ, αi, βj, ui, and vj) in order to minimize the local α-divergence
of factor (i, j), i.e. the divergence between f(i,j)
∏
(i′,j′)6=(i,j) f˜(i′,j′) and f˜(i,j)
∏
(i′,j′)6=(i,j) f˜(i′,j′).
This local divergence approximates the minimization of the global α-divergence between
the posterior p and approximation q under the assumption that the other factors f(i′,j′) are
well-approximated by f˜(i′,j′).
As our approximation q is a product of Gaussian densities, we take the messages to be
unnormalized Gaussian densities, noting that these densities are closed under multiplication
and we can implicitly rescale q(θk) to be a (normalized) Gaussian density after every iteration.
In order to minimize local α-divergence, the update step for variable θk from factor (i, j)
is given by
q′ (θk) = proj
q (θk)m−α(i,j)→θk (θk)∫
θ\θk
fα(i,j) (θ)
∏
θ\θk
q (θ)m−α(i,j)→θ (θ) dθ
 , (8)
q (θk)
new = q (θk)
 q′ (θk)
1− , (9)
m(i,j)→θk (θk)
new =
q (θk)
newm(i,j)→θk (θk)
q (θk)
. (10)
where proj [p] = argminqKL (p||q) denotes KL projection to the family of Gaussian densities
(matching the mean and variance of p) and  is a damping factor to aid with the convergence
of the algorithm. Define g(θl) ≡ q (θl)m−α(i,j)→θl (θl) and note g(θl) has the form of a Gaussian
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density, which we can take to be normalized. Then equation (8) can be written as
q′ (θk) = proj
[
g (θk)Eg,θ\θk
[
fα(i,j) (θ)
]]
. (11)
One particular strength of the Power EP approach is the ability to choose α such that
evaluating the above expectations is tractable. The choice of α also affects the shape of the
approximation q relative to p. Minka (Minka, 2005) notes the choice of α = −1 puts greater
emphasis on concentrating the mass of q inside higher density areas of the p (as opposed to
“covering” the posterior) and can lead q to understate the variability in the posterior. For
the logistic likelihood, the choice α = −1, is particularly compelling:
Eg,θ\θk
[
f−1(i,j) (θ)
]
= Eg,θ\θk
[
1 + exp
(−yij (µ+ αi + βj + uTi vj))] (12)
= 1 + Eg,θ\θk
[
exp (−yijµ) exp (−yijαi) exp (−yijβj) exp
(−yijuTi vj)] (13)
where the final expectation factors over each term. There are three sets of expectations to
evaluate: Eg,µ [exp (−yijµ)] (and equivalent expressions for the other univariate parameters),
Eg,vj
[
exp
(−yijuTi vj)], and Eg,ui,vj [exp (−yijuTi vj)]. The first two can be evaluated directly
from the moment generating functions for the univariate and multivariate Gaussian distri-
bution, and the last can be evaluated using the independence between the distributions over
ui and vj with complete the square techniques. Using µθk and σθk or Σθk when appropriate
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to denote the mean and variance of g(θk):
Eg,µ [exp (−yijµ)] = exp
(
−yijµµ + 1
2
σ2µ
)
, (14)
Eg,vj
[
exp
(−yijuTi vj)] = exp(−yijµTvjui + 12uTi Σvjui
)
, (15)
Eg,ui,vj
[
exp
(−yijuTi vj)] = Eg,ui[exp(−yijµTvjui + 12uTi Σvjui
)]
(16)
= det
(
Σ−1vj − Σui
)− 1
2
det
(
Σvj
)− 1
2 exp
(
−1
2
µTvjΣ
−1
vj
µvj
)
(17)
× exp
(
1
2
(
µui + Σ
−1
vj
µvj
)T (
Σ−1vj − Σui
)−1 (
µui + Σ
−1
vj
µvj
))
.
(18)
Completing the square, used in the last equation, relies on Σ−1vj −Σui being a positive definite
matrix in order for the resulting density to be a multivariate normal distribution.
We focus on the update steps for αi and ui, noting the symmetry in equation (13) with
respect to µ, αi, and βj, and similarly for ui and vj, implies the corresponding update steps
can be obtained by swapping the positions of the relevant variables. The updates take the
form
q′ (αi) = proj [g (αi) (1 + c1 exp (−yijαi))] , (19)
q′ (ui) = proj
[
g (αi)
(
1 + c2exp
(
−yijµTvjui +
1
2
uTi Σvjui
))]
, (20)
with
c1 = Eµ [exp (−yijµ)]Eβj [exp (−yijβj)]Eui,vj
[
exp
(−yijuTi vj)] ,
c2 = Eµ [exp (−yijµ)]Eαi [exp (−yijαi)]Eβj [exp (−yijβj)] .
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These densities can be represented as a linear combination of two Gaussian densities:
q′ (αi) = proj
[
N
(
αi;µαi , σ
2
αi
)
+ cN
(
αi;µαi − yijσ2αi , σ2αi
)]
, (21)
q′ (ui) = proj
[
N (ui;µg,Σg) + cN
(
ui;
(
Σ−1ui − Σvj
)−1 (
Σ−1ui µui − yijµvj
)
,
(
Σ−1ui − Σvj
)−1)]
,
(22)
where
c = Eµ [exp (−yijµ)]Eαi [exp (−yijαi)]Eβj [exp (−yijβj)]Eui,vj
[
exp
(−yijuTi vj)] (23)
and first and second moments can be calculated from each expression (after normalizing by
1
1+c
) to derive the corresponding Gaussian parameters.
To recap, our message passing algorithm will proceed as follows:
1. Initialize all messages m(i,j)→θk
2. Repeat until convergence of all messages:
(a) Choose factor (i, j)
(b) Update approximation to posterior q (θ) via equations (8) and (9). We find the
choice of  = 2 promising in simulations.
(c) Update messages from this factor m(i,j)→θk via equation (10)
2.3 Case-Control Approximation
The update step for each factor has O(1) computational cost, but each iteration over the
entire network has O(N2) computational cost and can be prohibitively expensive in large
networks. In addition, tracking the messages for each factor also has O(N2) storage com-
plexity. Drawing inspiration from (Raftery et al., 2012), we wish to take advantage of the
idea that large networks tend to be sparse and iterating over the entire network can be
computationally inefficient due to the extreme class imbalance. The influence contained in
each non-edge may be relatively small towards informing the overall model compared to the
influence of edges, which are many fewer in number.
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We propose iterating over the set of factors with yi,j = 1 and a random sample of factors
with yi,j = 0. In practice, drawing a single random sample is preferable to drawing a new
sample each iteration through the data due to the reduced time observed for the convergence
of the algorithm. In a temporal setting, a new sample can be drawn at each time step.
Supposing the number of observed edges E = |{i, j} : yi,j = 1| << N2 and a random sample
of non-edges of size O(E) is drawn, each iteration over the network would cost O(E) rather
than O(N2). Algorithmically, we treat this sample of factors as if it is the full set of data
available. To understand the effect of this choice on the means of our parameter estimates,
consider exponentiating both sides of equation (2):
pi,j
1− pi,j = exp(µ+ αi + βj + u
T
i vj). (24)
Intuitively, sampling a random proportion q of the non-edges inflates the odds-ratio on the
LHS by a factor of q−1. On the RHS, µ would shift upwards by −log(q) but the other
parameters would be unaffected. This suggests a simple post-hoc mean correction would
suffice to return the parameters to their original scale, although it should be noted the
posterior variance of the latent variables should be larger than if the full dataset were used.
We provide some evidence for the efficacy of this case-control approximation in Section 3.
2.4 Temporal Dynamics
Next, we introduce discrete time dynamics to the bilinear mixed-effects model by allowing
each of the latent variables to evolve via a Markov chain. Let θt,k denote the kth parameter
at time t, with the posterior of θt,k given (approximated) by
θt,k|Y1:t ∼ N(µ̂θt,k , Σ̂θt,k). (25)
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Supposing θt,k evolves via the Gaussian random walk
θt+1,k ∼ θt,k +N(0,Wt+1,k), (26)
the prior for θt+1,k would be given by
θt+1,k|Y1:t ∼ N(µ̂θt,k , Σ̂θt,k +Wt+1,k). (27)
We adopt the adaptive tuning procedure described in (McCormick et al., 2012) to deter-
mine the amount of additional variation to introduce at each time point. We parametrize
this amount of variation via a “forgetting” multiplier τt+1,k ≥ 1 to avoid specifying d × d
random walk matrices for ui and vj:
θt+1,k|Y1:t ∼ N(µ̂θt,k , τt+1,kΣ̂θt,k). (28)
We choose these multipliers τt+1 based on the average predictive likelihood:
τt+1 = argmax
τt+1
1
N2
∑
i,j
∫
θt+1
p(yi,j|θt+1,Y1:t)p(θt+1|Y1:t)dθt+1. (29)
Evaluating the integral above cannot be done in closed form, and we use a series of two
approximations to estimate it. First, note the likelihood term primarily involves the sigmoid
of the logistic mean function:
p(1|θt+1,Y1:t) = pt+1 = expit
(
µt+1 + αt+1,i + βt+1,j + u
T
t+1,ivt+1,j
)
, (30)
p(0|θt+1,Y1:t) = 1− pt+1. (31)
Recall the prior over each latent variable is an independent Gaussian. We approximate
uTt+1,ivt+1,j with a single Gaussian term (via their first two moments) in order to model the
entire mean function itself with a single Gaussian. Denoting the mean function with ψ, we
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use the following approximation for convoluting a sigmoid and a Gaussian could be used (see
(Bishop, 2006)):
∫
expit(ψ)N(ψ|µψ, σ2ψ) = expit((1 + piσ2ψ/8)−1/2µψ). (32)
Lastly, in order to reduce the computational cost involved in maximizing (29), we allow for
a single forgetting multiplier for µt+1, a single multiplier for the popularity terms αt+1,i and
βt+1,j, and a single multiplier for the latent space terms ut+1,i and vt+1,j, and only evaluate
(29) over a coarse grid of values. McCormick et al. (2012) argue searching over a coarse
grid leads to comparable results to directly maximizing (29) when running the algorithm
over sufficiently many time periods, as periods with unnecessary inflation in prior variance
can be balanced against periods with more restrictive inflation. Furthermore, the authors
found their results were robust to the choice of grid values. In Sections 3 and 4, we take
τ ∈ {1, 1.01, 1.1, 2}. This choice of values allows for no change in a parameter (τ = 0), as
well as forgetting multipliers corresponding to multiple scales of variance inflation.
2.5 Anomaly Detection
At an edge level, anomaly detection proceeds by scoring edges based on their probabilities
for observing activity, under the assumption that any past activity is non-anomalous and
thus is a good representation of normal behavior. We score the dyad i→ j at time t via its
predictive likelihood:
pˆi,j,t+1 ≡
∫
θt+1
p(yi,j|θt+1,Y1:t)p(θt+1|Y1:t)dθt+1, (33)
which can be evaluated via the approximations described in the previous section. Dyads
with activity but low predictive scores as well as dyads without activity but high predictive
scores would then be flagged as anomalous.
For many settings, we may be interested in detecting anomalies at a non-edge level. For
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example, in computer networks such as the LANL network described in Section 1, security
experts are interested in identifying anomalous subgraphs which may potentially represent
intruder attacks. (Neil et al., 2013a) mentions activity in the shape of k-stars and k-paths
as common behavior for intrusions. Note dyads in these subgraphs would consist solely
of edges with observed activity, so lower values of pˆi,j,t+1 would be characterized as more
anomalous. We can compute scores for these subgraphs from our edge level scores given a
conditional independence assumption, by multiplying the scores of the corresponding edges,
or equivalently, summing the log scores. For example, for the 3-path shown in figure 1, the
1 2 3 4
Figure 1: A directed 3-path.
score would be given by pˆ1,2,t+1pˆ2,3,t+1pˆ3,4,t+1.
In this paper, we choose to separately consider potentially anomalous behavior for each
time period, although combining scores across time may be promising, particularly in settings
with fine temporal resolution where attacks may span multiple periods. A fully online
detection procedure would proceed at each time step as follows:
1. Observe network behavior Yt
2. Tune forgetting multipliers (29)
3. Flag and assess potential anomalous subgraphs
4. Remove anomalous activity from Yt
5. Estimate model parameters Θt
3 Simulation Study
To provide an idea of how well our proposed algorithm can estimate a dynamic bilinear
mixed-effects model, we simulate a network following equations (1) and (2) and with time
dynamics following independent Gaussian random walks (see (26)). Specifically, we generate
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a network of size N = 500 from a bilinear mixed-effects model with latent dimension 2 with
the following priors:
µ1 ∼ N(−6.5, 0.1), (34)
α1,i ∼ N(0, 1), (35)
β1,j ∼ N(0, 1), (36)
u1,i ∼ N

0
0
 ,
0.75 0.15
0.15 0.75

 , (37)
v1,j ∼ N

0
0
 ,
0.75 0.15
0.15 0.75

 . (38)
We evolve the network 99 times for a total of T = 100 periods, where at every time point
each parameter follows a Gaussian random walk with (co)variance equal to 0.001 times its
prior (co)variance. These prior and random walk values were chosen to create a network
that would be roughly similar to the LANL computer network, that is, characterized by high
sparsity, strong heterogeneity between nodes, low temporal dynamics, and strong dependence
between time periods. The generated network averages about 2,000 directed connections per
time period, or 4 per node, which is slightly less than what we observe for the LANL network.
We compare results from two runs of the Power EP algorithm described in Section 2.2, one
that iterates over all 250,000 potential dyads in the network and another that implements
the case-control modification described in Section 2.3. For the latter, we sample 2.5% of
the non-edges at every time point for consideration, thus iterating over about 8,200 dyads
per time point. This results in about a 93.5% reduction in computation time and a 97%
reduction in storage complexity.
We compare mean estimates from each run against the generated values in terms of
log-likelihood, area under the receiver operating characteristic curve (ROC AUC), and the
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correlation between the actual and estimated edge probabilities on the logit scale. This
correlation is also calculated restricted to dyads not observed in any of the 100 time periods
(which is satisfied by 72.6% of all dyads). In Figure 2, we compare the model fit of the mean
estimates from the Power EP algorithm with and without the case-control approximation to
the model fit of the true parameter values. In these plots, the log-likelihood and ROC AUC
under the generating model provide a soft bound on model performance, as no other set of
parameter estimates should systematically outperform them over a prolonged period. The
estimates from our variational approach perform very similarly to the generating model,
particularly after time period 40, suggesting the approximations used in the variational
method have, at most, minor effects on the mean posterior estimates.
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Figure 2: Log-likelihood of the observed network Yt and ROC AUC of the edge probabilities pˆi,j,t.
Calculated for three sets of edge probabilities: the actual edge probabilities (black), the
edge probabilities estimated via the Power EP algorithm on the full data (red), and the
edge probabilities estimated via the Power EP algorithm with the case-control approxi-
mation (cyan).
In Figure 3, we plot the correlation between the actual edge probabilities and their
estimated counterparts on the logit scale. The performance of the algorithms ramp up over
time, as each binary network Y provides limited information about the underlying latent
variables which must be aggregated, and is largely stabilized by time 40. The case-control
modified algorithm, which iterates over a much smaller subset of the network at each time
point, does perform worse than the algorithm over the full network, but these differences are
largest in the earlier time periods.
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Figure 3: Correlation between the actual edge probabilities and estimated edge probabilities, both
on the logit scale. Results with probabilities from the full data are in red, and results
with probabilities from the case-control are in cyan.
Restricting ourselves to results from three time points, we plot the distributions of the
edge probabilities (again on the logit scale) against their actual counterparts in Figure 4,
and find minor systematic differences between the distributions. Note both sets of estimated
probabilities do struggle a bit (overestimating) modeling the extreme left tail of probabilities,
although these differences are exacerbated due to the logit scale (e.g. expit(−14) = 8.3e-07
and expit(−16) = 1.1e-07) and may be hard to capture given the time frame of the simulation
in comparison to the probability size.
Lastly, we find the increase in posterior variance of our parameters when adopting the
case-control modification to be largely acceptable. Even though we only consider about 3%
of the edges in any given time period, this subset of the network appears to capture most of
the information for estimating the model parameters.
Time Period µ αi βj ui,1 vj,2
T = 10 6.76 1.92 1.97 2.11 2.42
T = 25 1.92 2.47 2.55 2.10 2.32
T = 100 2.24 2.63 2.73 1.54 1.78
Table 1: Multiplier in posterior variance when using the case-control modification to the Power
EP algorithm. For node-specific parameters, the multiplier in variance is calculated for
each node and averaged.
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Figure 4: Actual versus estimated edge probabilities on the logit scale. Left column compare the
actual edge probabilities to estimates from the full Power EP, while the right column
represents the edge probabilities estimated via the case-control Power EP.
4 LANL Netflow Event Data
We demonstrate the potential for attack detection with Netflow communications data on
the LANL enterpise network (Turcotte et al., 2018). Event records correspond to directed
communication between two network devices and span a total of 89 days. We restrict to the
sub-network of the N = 27, 436 computers with some record of outgoing communications
over the 89 days, and aggregate the event records into four-hour intervals, yielding a total of
T = 532 time periods. These computers comprise the set of network devices which may be
the source of malicious behavior. We focus on modeling the presence of any directed network
activity between each dyad within each four-hour interval. The resulting network averages
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about 150,000 directed edges (or 5.5 outgoing edges for each computer) at each time interval,
and there is substantial variation in activity levels based on time-of-day and day-of-week.
The LANL data contains a red team attack in the form of a network scanning attack
from “Computer A” that begins on day 57, and we are interested in the ability for our
model to recognize this activity as anomalous. Following (Neil et al., 2013a), we detect
potentially anomalous subgraphs of the three shapes presented in Figure 5, corresponding to
common intrusion patterns. While malicious attacks may involve more nodes and activity,
detecting a single subgraph involved in the attack may suffice to identify the entire attack
upon further (manual) examination. Note the detection procedure described in this section
1 2 3 4 1 2
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Figure 5: A 3-path (left), a 3-star (right), and a “fork” (center) representing a combination of
the two.
deviates from the typical online setting since details of the red team attack were only obtained
after model estimation. Flagging potential anomalies only occurs after model estimation,
and the estimated probabilities used in this process assume all preceding network activity
was non-anomalous.
We estimate the bilinear mixed-effects model with latent dimension d = 2 using the
Power EP approach described in Section 2.2 with the case-control approximation of Section
2.3, taking a sample of the non-edges of average size 500,000 (corresponding to a case-
control rate of 3.3 or sampling proportion q ≈ 0.066%). We slightly modify the bilinear
mixed-effects model to incorporate time-of-day and day-of-week effects in the form of mean
shifts, with individual terms for each time-of-day and day-of-week pair calculated directly
from the mean activity levels over the 89 days. A slightly more sophisticated approach
would be to include them as additional parameters in the model to estimate. This would
allow these effects to naturally change over time, although there is little evidence for any
such changes in the observed data. We choose to separately model these terms from the
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overall popularity term µt in order to prevent the dynamics of this parameter to be governed
by periodicity effects rather than random walk behavior (Heard et al. (2014)). Note that
part of the periodicity effects may be due to recurrent, automated tasks (e.g. weekly at a
certain time of day), so allowing for more complicated periodicity effects or removing these
activities before estimation (if they are labeled or can be a priori identified) would likely
improve model fit.
Before turning to anomaly detection, we assess how well the bilinear mixed-effects model
and the popularity model omitting the latent interaction terms are able to predict LANL
network activity. Figure 6 plots the area under the receiver operating characteristic curve
(AUC ROC) of both models calculated using probabilities from the predictive likelihood (33),
which are primarily dependent on estimated parameters from the previous time period. Both
models perform quite well, with AUC > 0.995, suggesting the network communications data
is inherently very structured and predictable in nature. Model performance exhibits both
time-of-day and day-of-week periodicity, suggesting a more complex approach to modeling
periodicity is likely to improve performance, albeit performance is consistently high despite
these effects. The latent interaction terms in the bilinear mixed-effects model do seem
to substantially improve performance, with these improvements primarily driven by higher
probabilities for active dyads with generally low overall levels of popularity in the network.
We can compute anomaly scores for subgraphs of the types shown in Figure 5 by taking
the sum of the log probabilities as described in Section 2.5 . Despite the relative sparsity of
the network, the number of subgraphs to consider at each time frame remains quite large.
To reduce the number of subgraphs in consideration further, we only examine subgraphs
consisting of edges with log probability score of -10 or lower and remove some “overlapping”
subgraphs. Specifically, we remove 3-paths with the same middle edge “2”→ “3”, forks with
the same “2” node, and 3-stars with the same “1” node. Ideally, detecting one anomaly from
multiple overlapping subgraphs would suffice for finding the entire attack. In Figure 7, we
plot the 200 most anomalous subgraphs under each model. Both sets of subgraphs contain a
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Figure 6: Averaged AUC ROC for popularity model (red) and bilinear mixed-effects model (cyan)
over days. AUC ROC is calculated for each 4-hour interval using probabilities derived
from the predictive likelihood and results are averaged across each day.
single 3-star (highlighted in red) involving the network scanning attack from Computer A on
the first day of the red team attack. The rank of the Computer A 3-star is twice as high under
the bilinear mixed-effects model, where this anomaly would be detectable given an average
alarm rate of one subgraph per day. The difference in rank can be mainly attributed to low
scores on recurrent activity between low-popularity computers under the popularity model,
which is not flexible enough to model such activity. This leads to lower scores for certain
non-anomalous subgraphs, obfuscating the actual attack. Note our detection procedure
is largely unable to identify other attacks from Computer A in the following days. Once
anomalous behavior like the activity on day 57 is incorporated into the model of normal
activity, subsequent attacks appear to be normal behavior.
5 Discussion
In this paper, we present a variational approach for estimating the bilinear mixed-effects
model. We adapt our approach to a dynamic, large network setting via a case-control
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Figure 7: Anomaly scores for the 200 lowest scoring subgraphs observed over the 89 day period.
The red line corresponds to the rank of a subgraph containing part of a red team attack
on day 57.
approximation and an autotuning procedure to mimic Gaussian random walks on the model
parameters. We demonstrated the efficacy of our algorithm via a simulation study on N =
500 nodes, estimated the mixed-effects model on the LANL netflow communications network
involving over 25,000 computers for a period of 89 days, and detected a red team attack on
the same network while only requiring half the detection rate of the popularity model.
A natural extension for the bilinear mixed-effects model considered would be to allow
for node- or edge-level covariates in the specification of the mean function. Relational event
data is often provided with additional details which may be useful in conjunction with
network-based predictors for predicting activity. Along a similar line of reasoning, edge-
level covariate data may distinguish between multiple types of network activity which we
may wish to model jointly. In particular, the LANL netflow data includes sender port
information, and utilizing this information would help distinguish between typical activity
on a commonly used port and unusual activity on a rarely used port. Lastly, adapting the
algorithm to handle different outcome measures may allow for a more faithful representation
of the observed event data. For example, acknowledging the data’s continuous-time nature,
we could model the communication activity using Poisson processes with time dependent
intensities in order to exploit detailed information about the timing of expected activity.
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